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Abstract 
This paper examines the thesis that monopsony power is an important determinant of 
wages in nursing labor markets. Using data from the 1985-93 Current Population Surveys, 
measures of relative nursejnon-nurse wage rates for 252 labor markets are constructed. 
Contrary to predictions from the monopsony model, no positive relationship exists between 
relative nursing wages and hospital density or market size. Nor is support found for the 
presence of monopsony power based on evidence on union wage premiums, slopes of 
experience profiles, or the mix of RN to total hospital employment. 
JEL classification: J42; J44; Ill 
Keywords: Monopsony; Nurses; Wages; Labor markets 
1. Introduction 
The labor market for registered nurses has received considerable attention from 
researchers owing, at least in part, to the reported shortages that have appeared 
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periodically in nursing markets. 1 One explanation for nursing shortages, popular 
in the nursing literature and economics textbooks, is that hospitals face an upward 
sloping labor supply curve and thus possess monopsony (or oligopsony) power 
(one of the earliest statements is Yett, 1970). The upward sloping supply curve 
results in a lower wage and employment level for nurses than would occur if the 
market were competitive. Monopsony would help explain reported shortages, since 
hospitals will list vacancies and desire to hire additional workers at the monopson­
istic wage, but would decrease their profitability were they to raise wages to attract 
more applications. 
Although the monopsony model has considerable theoretical appeal, empirical 
evidence for monopsony power in nursing labor markets is mixed. Previous 
studies have focused either on the potential for monopsony power, based on 
estimates of labor supply curve elasticities facing hospitals (e.g., Sloan and 
Richupan, 1975; Link and Settle, 1979; Link and Settle, 198 1; Sullivan, 1989; and 
Hansen, 1991), or examined the relationship between hospital wages, employment, 
and market structure (e.g., Hurd, 1973; Link and Landon, 1975; Sloan and Elnicki, 
1978; Feldman and Scheffler, 1982; and Bruggink et al., 1985). 
In perhaps the most careful and detailed study of monopsony to date, Sullivan 
(1989) utilizes data for 1979-85 from the American Hospital Association's 
Annual Surveys of Hospitals in order to estimate the inverse elasticities of labor 
supply facing hospitals. Following research by Bresnahan (1981) and Baker and 
Bresnahan (1988), he takes the equilibrium market structure as given and then 
estimates the supply elasticities under three alternative assumptions about the 
nature of the market equilibrium (employment setting, wage setting, and consistent 
conjectural variations). These estimates translate into a one year labor supply 
elasticity of about 1.25, and a three year elasticity of about 4.0. Contrary to 
expectations from the monopsony model, Sullivan's results do not differ substan­
tially between metropolitan and non-metropolitan hospitals. Nor does he compare 
these results to those performed on any alternative ' ' non-monopsonistic'' occupa­
tion. 2 We argue below that an important limitation of this approach is that the 
presence of an upward sloping labor supply curve is necessary but not sufficient 
evidence of a monopsonistic outcome. Rather, wage and employment outcomes 
predicted by the monopsony model must be directly tested. 
1 See, for example, Aiken (1987), Buerhaus (1987), McKibbin (1990), and Hassancin (1991). More 
recently, reports of nursing shortages have declined (Brider, 1993). 
2 Hansen (1991) provides an extension of the Sullivan study. She sets up a general nonlinear 
supply-demand model that includes both competition and monopsony as subcases. In her model, an 
exogenous shock in an input market that pivots rather than shifts the supply curve allows the 
competitive case to distinguished from the monopsonistic case. Empirically, Hansen can not reject the 
null hypothesis of competition in the market for nurses. When she runs the test separately for rural and 
urban nurses, she again finds no evidence for monopsony. 
0167-6296/95/$09.50 © 1995 Elsevier Science B.Y. All rights reserved 
SSDI 0 1 6 7 - 6 2 9 6 ( 9 5 )0 0 0 1 3-5 
B. T. Hirsc h, E.J. Schumacher/ Journal of Health Economics 14 (1995) 443-476 445 
Previous studies examining the relationship between market structure and 
nursing wages generally find the positive relationship between wages and the 
degree of competition predicted by monopsony theory. Because larger (more 
competitive) markets tend to have both higher skill workers and higher wages in 
nursing and alternative non-nursing occupations (due in part to cost-of-living 
differences), these studies do not provide a convincing test of monopsony power. 
An exception is a careful study by Adamache and Sloan (1982), who examine the 
real wages of RNs, LPNs, kitchen workers and secretaries employed in hospitals. 
In contrast to the above studies, they find no effect of concentration on entry level 
compensation for union or nonunion workers, after controlling for cost-of-living 
and population density. 
Adamache and Sloan (1982) also analyze the relationship between unions, 
tenure, and monopsony. They argue that a negative correlation between tenure and 
turnover suggests that monopsony power should depress wages relatively most for 
workers at the top of the wage scale; that is, flatten the wage-experience profile. 
In regressions with the variation in bottom-to-top pay for kitchen workers, RNs, 
and LPNs as dependent variables, they find no significant effect of concentration 
on wage dispersion among RNs and LPNs, contrary to the prediction of the 
monopsony model of less dispersion in more concentrated markets. They also 
argue that unions should have countervailing power that offsets the effects of 
monopsony. They again find no evidence for this proposition. 3 
Our study extends the work of Adamache and Sloan (1982) and others by 
analyzing how wage. and employment outcomes differ across markets more and 
less likely to be monopsonistic. We test the prediction that relative nursing wage 
rates for registered nurses (and perhaps other nursing personnel) will be lowest in 
relatively small labor markets with a limited number of employers. An important 
contribution of the study is the use of a large dataset on individual workers 
constructed from the monthly Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation 
Group (CPS ORG) files for the period October 1985 through December 1993. 
These data allow us to examine the relative wage rates of hospital and non-hospital 
registered nurses (RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and nursing aides, as 
compared to alternative control groups of non-health related workers, across 202 
3 Robinson ( 1988) addresses the monopsony question by looking at differences across markets in 
employment and occupational mix. Under the assumption that non-nurse labor markets are competitive, 
the marginal factor cost of nurses is more expensive relative to non-nurses in monopsonistic than in 
competitive labor markets. Both employment and the proportion of all hospital jobs filled by nurses, 
therefore, should be higher in competitive than in highly concentrated nursing labor markets. 
Consistent with the monopsony model, he finds that in a cross section of hospitals, total employment 
(controlling for measures of output) and the ratio of RNs to LPNs initially increases as market 
concentration decreases. The relationship is nonlinear, however, with a reversal among markets with 
extremely low concentration. 
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metropolitan areas and 50 non-urban state groups. The 1985-93 period is particu­
larly appropriate for study, since most of these years have been described as 
characterized by widespread and sustained nursing shortages (McKibbin, 1990). 
Contrary to the predictions of the monopsony model, we find no evidence that the 
relative wages of nursing personnel are positively related to either labor market 
size or hospital density. 
The scope of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we examine the theory and 
testable implications of monopsony models of nursing labor markets. The data set 
is described in Section 3, followed in Section 4 by a presentation of descriptive 
evidence on the relative wage rates for nursing personnel during the 1985-93 
period. Our estimation approach is outlined and empirical results are presented in 
Sections 5 and 6. A brief conclusion follows. 
2. Monopsony in nursing labor markets: Theory and implications 
Monopsony here refers to a labor market where there is a limited number of 
employers (e.g., hospitals). Each firm faces an upward sloping labor supply curve 
of nursing personnel when making its hiring and salary decisions, with the 
marginal labor cost (MLC) exceeding labor's opportunity cost at each level of 
employment. Fig. 1 illustrates the standard single buyer monopsony model. Profit 
maximization by the hospital would lead to employment at £111, where the 
hospital's marginal revenue product (MRP) equals MLC, and a wage W111 that will 
just attract employment £111• Both employment and wages would be lower than 
would exist in a competitive labor market, where employment and wages would 
tend toward Ec and We. At the profit maximizing wage for the monopsonist, there 
Wage 
We 
Wm 
Em Ec 
t.Aarglnallabor Cost 
Employment 
Fig. 1. Monopsony in the labor market. 
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exists a nursing "shortage" in the sense that the hospital would prefer to hire 
more nursing personnel at wage Wm, but is unable to do so. An increase in 
employment beyond Em would require the hospital to raise wages, but this action 
would in turn lower its profits. 4 
In the more likely case where there exist several employers, wage-employment 
outcomes are theoretically indeterminate. If hospitals and other large employers 
act in collusion (e.g., implicitly or explicitly through information sharing arrange­
ments) to "cooperate" and limit wages and employment to the level that 
maximizes joint profits, then something similar to the monopsonistic outcome can 
be achieved. It is widely recognized that this is not a stable equilibrium. Wage­
employment outcomes similar to competitive outcomes can obtain, even when the 
number of employers is small and labor mobility is weak, if employers behave in a 
noncooperative and rivalrous fashion. That is, it will be in the interest of 
individual employers to raise wages above the prevailing monopsonistic level in 
order to attract large supplies of nurses away from their competitors. If enough 
employers behave in this fashion, maximizing individual rather than joint profits 
leads to the competitive outcome. 
An alternative to the collusion model are noncooperative leader-follower 
models with a dominant employer and a competitive fringe. For example, a large 
hospital may set its wage, based in part on the expected reaction (i.e., employ­
ment) by smaller wage-taking employers. The precise wage-employment outcome 
in such models varies with the specific assumptions. But these models typically 
lead to a prediction of lower wages and employment than with a competitive 
outcome (see Sullivan, 1989, fur a presentation of alternative models). 
An additional possibility is that of a monopsonist that can wage (i.e., price) 
discriminate. Perfect wage discrimination would imply that a monopsonist pays 
individual nurses exactly their reservation wages; that is, bids up the labor supply 
curve. In this (admittedly unlikely) case, monopsony would imply, as before, 
lower wages (except for workers at the margin), but would not imply a decrease in 
employment or a "shortage" of nurses. Wage discrimination by employers with 
monopsonistic power might be evinced by a larger residual variance of wages in 
monopsonistic than in competitive markets. That is, there would be greater wage 
dispersion among nurses with given characteristics (i.e., productivity), correspond­
ing to the dispersion in reservation wages, whereas employers in competitive 
markets must pay the same market wage to all workers of equal productivity. 
Monopsonistic power may also take the form of a flatter wage-experience 
profile in smaller, less competitive markets. If experienced (often married) nurses 
are less mobile than younger entry level (and less often married) nurses, wages 
4 If monopsony is accompanied by monopoly in the product market, then output, employment, and 
wages will be even lower than with monopsony alone. 
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should not rise as quickly with respect to experience in less competitive markets. 5 
Reputation and implicit contracts play an important role here. On the one hand, if 
wages are determined competitively at entry and contracts are short run, entry-level 
nurses will demand even higher initial wages since they do not expect employers 
to increase wages fully with respect to future productivity. This reinforces our 
prediction about relatively flatter slopes of earnings profiles in smaller markets. 6 
The monopsony outcome requires that there be limited long-run mobility of 
nursing personnel across and within labor markets. Existence of an upward sloping 
market supply curve (i.e., a positive employment-wage relationship) does not 
imply non-competitive outcomes. A necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
monopsonistic wage-employment outcome is that there be an upward sloping 
labor supply curve facing individual hospitals (employers). One may find empiri­
cal evidence of upward sloping short-run labor supply curves facing hospitals 
(Sullivan, 1989) because of long-run implicit contracts between nurses and 
hospitals. Such contracts require that hospitals are able to structure compensation 
in ways that increase the attachment of nurses to their current employer, and that 
hospitals develop a reputation for non-opportunistic behavior. Firm-specific train­
ing, pay sequencing that back-end loads compensation (wages or fringes), and 
various forms of incentive contracts act to lower worker mobility and break down 
the equality between wages and workers' spot marginal products (see Lazear, 
1991; and Hutchens, 1989). A decrease in wages owing to a hospital-specific 
demand shock, for example, would not result in the loss of all nurses to other 
employers. What appears to be evidence for monopsony (i.e., a less than perfectly 
elastic labor supply schedule) may in fact reflect implicit contracts that maximize 
the joint surplus of hospitals and nurses. 7 
For these reasons, testing whether hospitals face upward sloping labor supply 
curves is not a sufficient test of the monopsony model. Rather, one must examine 
5 This is essentially the argument made by Adamache and Sloan (1982). 
6 On the other hand, hospitals may develop a reputation as non-opportunistic employers, in which 
case long-run implicit contracts should lead to a compensation profile that maximizes the joint surplus 
of hospitals and nurses. In this latter case, the present value of lifetime earnings is at least as high as in 
markets where wages equal workers' spot marginal products. Absent further assumptions about 
differences in implicit contracts, incentive effects, and pay sequencing in competitive and monopsonis­
tic labor markets, few testable implications arise. 
7 The arguments in this paragraph apply not only to nursing labor markets. In fact, the prevalence in 
nursing of transferable general training, rather than nontransferable firm specific training, implies that 
implicit long-term contracts are even more important in many non-nursing labor markets. If we are 
correct, then studies such as the one by Sullivan ( 1989) should find evidence of upward sloping 
firm-level labor supply curves in a wide variety of occupations. The presence of implicit contracts may 
help account for the "surprising" finding by Sullivan that the inverse elasticities of nursing labor 
supply curves did not differ between hospitals in large metropolitan markets and those in smaller 
markets. 
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directly whether the wage-employment outcomes predicted by the monopsony 
model, as compared to outcomes from the competitive model, in fact occur. The 
approach taken in this paper, therefore, is to examine directly testable implications 
that follow under most variants of the monopsony model. Most important is the 
prediction that wages will be lower in monopsonistic labor markets than in 
otherwise similar competitive markets. And, except in the unlikely event that an 
employer can perfectly price discriminate, employment and the ratio of employ­
ment to other factors will be lower. 
Because monopsony requires limited mobility of labor and a relatively small 
number of employers, we should find that the monopsony outcome is more 
prevalent the smaller the labor market and the fewer the number of employers. 
Rural and small town markets are likely to have relatively few hospitals, nursing 
homes, and doctors' offices over large geographic areas, while nurses in such 
markets (particularly those who are married) may have limited mobility. If 
monopsonistic power is a major factor in the nursing labor market, it is these 
markets where its effects should be observed. By contrast, highly' populated urban 
areas, with numerous hospitals and many alternative nurse and non-nurse employ­
ment opportunities, are least likely to show the effects of buyer power in the labor 
market. 
Our empirical test of monopsony therefore requires that we determine whether 
wages in a labor market are low relative to a counterfactual competitive outcome, 
and to measure market characteristics such as size and/or number of employers. 
Such information allows us to examine whether wage rates diverge from those 
observed in competitive markets, and whether the pattern of divergence is 
consistent with that predicted by the monopsony model. Because wages vary 
across areas, in part because of unmeasured site-specific amenities and locational 
attributes (Roback, 1982), our wage measure will rely on a comparison of nursing 
wages to those of a control group of non-nursing workers with similar characteris­
tics in the same market. We will also examine alternative implications of the 
monopsony model, including its potential effects on wage-experience profiles, 
distortions of the employment mix, and the role of labor unions as a countervailing 
force. 
3. Data 
The primary data for this study are drawn from the monthly Current Population 
Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files for the period October 1985 
through December 1993 (99 surveys). The CPS ORG files .have not been used 
previously in the nursing literature. The CPS is conducted by the Bureau of the 
Census and includes large representative samples of U.S. households. In each 
month's survey a quarter of the sample (the outgoing rotation groups) are asked 
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not only the standard demographic and employment questions, but also questions 
from an earnings supplement that includes responses on weekly earnings, hours 
worked per week, and union status. 8 The annual CPS earnings files, containing 
data for all 12  monthly surveys in each year, are not public use tapes, but are made 
available through the research and data services staff at the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Beginning in October 1985, the CPS identified each individual's 
location as either in or out of one of 202 Metropolitan Statistical Areas or 
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA/CMSA) with populations of 
100,000 (in July 1983). 9 Those not in a designated MSA/CMSA either reside in 
a small MSA or a non-metropolitan area. Thus we have representative national 
samples with all workers assigned to one of 252 market areas (202 MSAjCMSAs 
and 50 non-urban state groups). 
Our nursing sample includes all hospital and non-hospital registered nurses 
(RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and nursing aides who are employed 
wage and salary workers ages 18 and over with positive weekly earnings and 
hours. Workers whose primary activity is school, whose implied real wage rate is 
less than a dollar, or who have had their occupation allocated by the Census are 
excluded from the sample. Sample sizes of these groups for the October 1985 
through December 1993 period are as follows: RNs - 24,345, RNs employed in 
hospitals - 17,296, LPNs - 6,119, and aides - 20,166. 
In addition, we utilize three control groups to construct measures of relative 
wages by labor market. We construct a large initial control sample that includes all 
female workers (meeting the same criteria as above, except the occupation 
non-allocation requirement) in non-health related occupations within the following 
broad occupational groups: executive, administrative and managerial; professional 
specialty; technicians and related support; sales; administrative support and cleri­
cal; and service (except protective and household services). This large control 
sample is then divided into three distinct control groups along educational lines. 
Those with at least a college degree comprise the control group with whom the 
wages of RNs are compared (n = 127,831); those with a high school degree or 
some college make up the control group for LPNs (n = 341,365); and those with 
less than a high school degree are used as the control group for aides (n = 38,689). 
8 The sample design of the CPS is that a household is included for 4 months, followed by 8 months 
out, followed by 4 months in. Only the outgoing rotation groups (rotations 4 and 8) are asked the 
earnings questions. Hence, the ORG or earnings files include all individuals surveyed in the CPS, but 
only once in a year. 
9 There are 181 MSAs and 21  CMSAs. The latter (with the exception of St. Louis) contain two or 
more primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs). Prior to October 1985, there were identifiers in 
the CPS for only 44 large Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). 
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We should emphasize at the outset that our basic results and conclusions are not 
sensitive to the choice of control groups. 10 
The CPS ORG files have several advantages relative to other data sources. In 
contrast to data from the AHA surveys, the CPS provides information on 
individual worker (but not hospital) characteristics. 11 CPS data also are available 
in a timely fashion on an annual basis and information is available on current 
earnings, hours, union status, and occupation, as opposed to the previous year's 
earnings and occupation on the longest job held last year as in the Census of 
Population (union status is not reported in the Censqs). The CPS also includes 
information on nursing personnel employed not only in hospitals, but also outside 
of hospitals within the same labor market. Previous literature has focused primar­
ily on hospital employees. Most important for our study, the CPS provides large 
representative samples of potential groups with whom nurses can be compared, 
with information taken from the same surveys and with detailed area (i.e., labor 
market) identifiers. The primary disadvantage of the CPS is that it lacks informa­
tion on occupational grade and responsibilities (apart from the designation of RN, 
LPN, or aide) or on employer characteristics, apart from industry (hospital, 
nursing home, etc.) and sector (private, federal, state, or local). 
The comparison of nursing and non-nursing wages is a critical component of 
this study. By measuring nursing wages relative to control groups within the same 
labor markets, we are able to control not only for differences in measurable worker 
characteristics, but also for cost of living differences, area amenities or disameni­
ties, area-specific unmeasured labor quality, differences in working conditions, 
and other market-specific wage determinants that otherwise are not easily mea­
sured. The measurement of relative wages for nurses within areas is made possible 
by comparing nursing wages (RNS, LPNs, and aides) within each labor market to 
the wages of their respective control group in that market, after controlling for 
measurable worker and market characteristics. The implication of the monopsony 
model is that nursing wages, relative to their control groups, will be lower in labor 
markets that are small and with a limited number of employers. Our method 
should be reliable unless unmeasured area-specific determinants of relative 
nursing to control group wages are systematically related to market size and 
number of employers. 
10 Because monopsony power might in principle affect the wages of health professionals outside 
nursing, we chose to exclude all workers in health-related occupations from the control groups. By way 
of summary, excluded from the control group samples are males; female workers in health-related 
occupations within the selected broad occupational categories; and workers in the following non-selected 
occupational groups: private household services; protective services; farming, forestry, and fishing; 
precision production, craft, and repair; machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors; transportation 
and material moving; and handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers. 
11 Sullivan (1989) provides a good discussion of the AHA data. 
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A second source of data is Hospital Statistics, a summary of information 
collected and published by the American Hospital Association (1989-90) based on 
their Annual Survey of Hospitals. Data by metropolitan area and non-metropolitan 
area by state are provided on such things as number of hospitals, employment by 
type of personnel (RNs, LPNs, etc.), compensation costs, total expenditures and 
per patient costs, patient days, and number of trainees. Because relative differ­
ences across areas in number of hospitals changes slowly, we matched the 1989 
figures to our 1985-93 sample. 12 
4. Nursing wages and employment, 1985-93: A descriptive overview 
Prior to our formal analysis, we provide a descriptive overview of relative 
wages for nursing personnel. Table 1 presents mean real wages for RNs, LPNs, 
and nursing aides by year, and the ratio of these wages to the wages of their 
respective control groups. Wage rates are measured by usual weekly earnings 
divided by usual hours worked per week, in constant December 1993 dollars 
(based on the monthly CPI-U). 13 Real wages for RNs increased substantially 
during the 1985-93 period, both absolutely and relative to the control group of 
female college graduates in alternative occupations. For example, the average real 
wage for hospital R.Ns increased from $"!5.46 in 1985:4 to $18.70 in 1993, while 
the wage relative to the control group rose from a ratio of 1 . 12 to 1.27 during this 
brief period. Particularly rapid wage increases occurred during 1987-90, a period 
often characterized as one of severe nursing shortages. Note that the increase in 
relative wage rates for RNs is particularly noteworthy because RNs are being 
compared to college educated women in white collar occupations. This is the very 
group of workers whose wages rose most rapidly during the period; that is, there 
were widening skill and narrowing gender wage gaps during this period (Levy and 
12 Hospi tal Statistics provides data at the MSA/PMSA level and for the non-metropolitan portion of 
each state. In order to get an exact match for the 21 CMSAs designated in the CPS, the hospital data 
were aggregated from the component PMSAs. Information on small MSAs (below 100,000 population) 
that are not separately designated in the CPS was added to that on the non-metropolitan portion of the 
state to calculate values for our 50 non-urban state areas. 
13 Weekly earnings arc top-coded at $999 per week in surveys through 1988, and at $1,923 beginning 
in January 1989. A maximum of 1.2 percent of RNs are at the earnings cap in any year (1988); 0.3 
percent of the RN sample is at the cap in 1993. The highly educated RN control group includes 3.9 
percent of the sample at the earnings cap in 1988, and 0.7 percent in 1993. Workers at the lower cap 
during 1985-88 are assigned earnings based on mean real earnings above that same real dollar amount 
in 1989, calculated separately for the three groups of nursing personnel combined with their control 
groups. The assigned mean earnings typically ranged between $1,300 and $1,400 in nominal weekly 
earnings (and $1,700-$1,800 in December 1993 earnings). No adjustment is made for workers at the 
higher cap beginning in 1989. 
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Table 1 
Mean wage rates and relative wage ratios for nursing personnel and control groups by year, 1985-93 
1985:4 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 n 
Hospital RNs 15.46 15.67 16.06 16.97 17.69 18.01 18.48 18.42 18.70 17,296 
Hosp. RNsl 1.12 1.10 1.11 1.18 1.23 1.22 1.26 1.25 1.27 127,831 
ControiRN 
All RNs 14.98 15.35 15.62 16.44 16.99 17.38 17.69 17.73 18.07 24,345 
RNsiControlRN 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.14 1.18 1.18 1.21 1.20 1.23 127,831 
LPNs 10.12 10.28 10.54 10.79 10.86 11.02 11.20 11.57 11.47 6,119 
LPNsiControiLPN 1.09 1.08 1.10 1.12 1.15 1.16 1.18 1.22 1.21 341,365 
Nursing Aides 7.37 7.57 7.56 7.45 7.69 7.81 7.80 7.70 7.86 20,166 
Aides I Control A 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.01 1.11 1.10 1.11 1.08 1.11 38,689 
Shown are mean real wage rates and wage ratios by year. Data are from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files for October 1985 through December 1993. Sample sizes 
(n) listed on the rows showing wage ratios are for the designated control groups. Wage rates are 
measured by usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours worked per week, in December 1993 dollars 
(indexed by monthly CPI-U). The sample includes all RNs, LPNs, and Aides, ages 18 and over, with 
positive earnings and hours, excluding workers whose primary activity is schooling and with a real 
wage rate less than one dollar. The three control groups include all women, ages 18 and over and with 
the same restrictions as above, in non-health related occupations within the following broad occupa­
tional groups:executive, administrative and managerial; professional specialty; technicians and related 
support; sales; administrative support and clerical; and service (except protective and household 
services). The RN control group includes those with at least a college degree; the LPN control group 
those with a high school degree or some college; and the Aides control group those with less than a 
high school degree. 
Murnane, 1992). LPNs also realized substantial absolute and relative wage gains 
over the period, whereas nursing aides received relatively small gains. 
Table 2 provides mean wage rates and relative wage rates by nursing group for 
the pooled 1985-93 period, disaggregated by labor market size. As noted previ­
ously, the CPS designates individuals as residing either in one of 202 
MSAjCMSAs with a population that exceeded 100 thousand (in 1983), or 
elsewhere in one of the 50 states. These 252 areas are grouped into eight size 
categories based on 1990 Census of Population counts: the 50 non-urban state 
areas; and groups of MSAjCMSAs with populations below 200 thousand, be­
tween 200-300 thousand, 300-500 thousand, 500 thousand to 1 million, 1-2 
million, 2-5 million, and 5 million and over (the latter category includes five 
CMSAs). The 50 non-urban state areas include 32.4 percent of the nursing 
personnel and 26.6 percent of the control group sample. 
It is evident from Table 2 that wage rates for RNs, LPNs, and aides (as well as 
the control group occupations) rise substantially with respect to labor market size. 
Hospital RNs, for example, earned $19.25 in the largest metropolitan areas, as 
compared to $15.78 in non-urban areas. Although the finding of lower wages in 
small markets provides evidence superficially supportive of the monopsony model, 
it is not compelling evidence since differences in other wage determinants also 
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Table 2 
Mean wage rates and relative wage ratios for nursing personnel and control groups by area size 
category 
AJI Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Size 6 Size 7 Size 8 
Hospital RNs 17.47 15.78 16.64 17.17 16.72 17.34 17.45 18.40 19.25 
Hosp. RNsl 1.20 1.27 1.35 1.20 1.24 1.25 1.26 1.18 1.15 
Contro!RN 
All RNs 16.89 15.18 16.06 16.70 16.18 16.73 16.85 17.86 18.85 
RNsiControiRN 1.16 1.22 1.30 1.17 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.14 1.12 
LPNs 10.94 9.95 10.24 11.14 10.96 11.33 11.18 11.79 13.02 
LPNsiControl LPN 1.15 1.22 1.20 1.15 1.25 1.21 1.18 1.14 1.16 
Nursing Aides 7.68 6.86 7.14 8.03 7.40 7.74 7.57 8.41 9.06 
Aides I Control A 1.07 1.05 1.09 1.14 1.13 1.09 1.11 l.LO 1.09 
Sample sizes: all 50,630 16,421 2,289 2,233 3,160 5,776 3,746 8,108 8,897 
nursing groups 
Sample sizes: all 507,885 134,858 19,492 24,270 29,978 62,015 43,414 95,052 98,806 
control groups 
Mean number 22.0 55.2 3.3 4.6 7.0 12.1 19.4 44.2 138.0 
of hospitals 
Mean hospitals per 0.49 0.18 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.60 0.73 1.07 1.63 
100 square miles 
Mean hospitals per 1.87 2.02 2.27 1.87 1.81 1.62 1.43 1.49 1.36 
100 thousand pop. 
Number of MSAI 252 [50] 49 38 42 36 16 16 5 
CMSAs 
or [state groups] 
See the note to Table 1. Data are pooled over 1985:4-1993:4. Size categories 2-7 are MSAICMSAs; 
Size category 1 includes non-urban state groups. Populations among the size categories are as follows: 
Size 1 = 50 non-urban state areas (includes non-metropolitan area workers, and those residing in 
metropolitan areas with populations less than 100,000); Size 2 = 100-200 thousand; Size 3 = 200-300 
thousand; Size 4 = 300-500 thousand; Size 5 = 500 thousand to 1 million; Size 6 = 1-2 million; Size 
7 = 2-5 million; Size 8 = 5 million and over. 
lead to systematic wage differentials by market size. As seen in Table 2, when the 
wage rates of nursing personnel are measured relative to their respective control 
groups, relative wages for RNs and LPNs are lowest in the largest labor markets. 
For example the relative wages of hospital RNs to their control group is 1.27 in 
the 50 non-urban markets, 1.35 in metropolitan areas with populations 100,000 to 
200,000, and only 1.15 in the largest CMSAs. The wage ratios for nursing aides 
indicate low relative wages in nonurban labor markets, but no size pattern across 
urban markets. Subsequent analysis will examine relative wage differences across 
labor markets following control for other measurable wage determinants. 
Although not the main focus of the paper, we present in Table 3 regression 
estimates from standard log wage equations estimated for hospital RNs, all RNs, 
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LPNs, Aides, and their respective female control groups. Variables included are 
years of schooling completed; years of potential experience (measured by age 
minus schooling minus six) and its square; and dummy variables for union 
Table 3 
Standard log wage equation estimates for nursing personnel and control groups 
Hosp. RNs All RNs 
Hospital 0.1237 
(21.27) 
Nursing -0.0592 
home ( -6.55) 
Physician -0.0972 
office ( -9.37) 
School 0.0278 0.0303 
(19.11) (23.08) 
Experience 0.0123 0.0119 
(15.71) (17.54) 
Exp2 /100 -0.0243 -0.0244 
( -12.94) ( -15.85) 
Union 0.0198 0.0290 
coverage (3.43) (5.20) 
Male -0.0060 0.0156 
( -0.60) (1.62) 
Married with 0.0187 0.0276 
spouse (2.70) (4.11) 
present 
Married 0.0083 0.0240 
previously (0.98) (3.03) 
Black -0.0994 -0.1089 
( -10.46) ( -12.65) 
Other race -0.0244 -0.0310 
(-2.48) (-3.19) 
Part-time 0.0326 0.0226 
(6.15) (4.70) 
Federal 0.0265 0.0382 
(2.25) (3.21) 
State 0.0020 0.0240 
(0.19) (2.74) 
Local -0.0157 -0.0221 
( -1.78) ( -2.95) 
Kids 1 0.0126 0.0022 
(1.93) (0.37) 
Kids 2 0.0205 0.0105 
(3.03) (1.68) 
Kids 3 0.0010 -0.0081 
(0.10) ( -0.93) 
Kids 4+ 0.0161 -0.0024 
(1.08) ( -0.17) 
ControlRN LPNs 
0.0562 
(5.09) 
-0.0102 
( -0.86) 
-0.0652 
( -3.95) 
0.0761 0.0184 
(69.27) (6.41) 
0.0243 0.0109 
(60.72) (8.85) 
-0.0543 -0.0200 
( -56.24) ( -7.81) 
0.0757 0.0453 
(20.76) (4.13) 
0.0019 
(0.10) 
0.0623 0.0190 
(17.74) (1.48) 
0.0457 0.0131 
(10.05) (0.95) 
-0.0548 -0.0418 
( -11.28) ( -3.77) 
-0.0794 -0.0411 
( -12.70) ( -1.88) 
-0.2503 0.0077 
( -70.69) (0.91) 
0.1651 -0.0526 
(23.46) ( -2.26) 
0.0900 0.0540 
(18.89) (3.32) 
0.0429 -0.0332 
(11.44) ( -2.38) 
-0.0131 0.0084 
(-3.58) (0.82) 
-0.0343 0.0081 
( -8.56) (0.76) 
-0.0816 0.0256 
( -12.04) (1.74) 
-0.1130 0.0253 
( -8.60) (1.05) 
Control LPN 
0.0712 
(92.94) 
0.0240 
(120.16) 
-0.0422 
( -102.62) 
0.1361 
(59.28) 
0.0608 
(28.27) 
0.0344 
(13.95) 
-0.0878 
( -36.20) 
-0.0659 
( -16.37) 
-0.2495 
( -155.33) 
0.2056 
(58.19) 
0.0694 
(20.73) 
-0.0210 
(-8.47) 
-0.0183 
( -9.88) 
-0.0243 
(-11.58) 
-0.0632 
( -19.24) 
-0.0890 
( - 15.65) 
Aides 
0.2041 
(29.02) 
0.0061 
(0.94) 
0.2805 
(16.38) 
0.0349 
(25.12) 
0.0111 
(16.97) 
-0.0176 
( -14.06) 
0.1169 
(15.85) 
0.0215 
(2.38) 
0.0506 
(6.88) 
0.0088 
(1.09) 
-0.0608 
( -9.69) 
-0.0289 
( -2.10) 
-0.0240 
(-4.16) 
0.1295 
(6.34) 
0.1129 
(12.45) 
0.0308 
(3.26) 
0.0050 
(0.71) 
0.0099 
(1.27) 
0.0078 
(0.75) 
0.0033 
(0.22) 
Control A 
0.0258 
(23.91) 
0.0115 
(21.96) 
-0.0150 
( -17.93) 
0.2076 
(30.09) 
0.0617 
(9.04) 
0.0208 
(2.91) 
-0.0442 
( -7.26) 
-0.0097 
( -0.98) 
-0.1491 
( -35.08) 
0.2763 
(18.92) 
0.0688 
(5.94) 
0.0514 
(7.20) 
-0.0053 
(-0.93) 
-0.0124 
( -1.88) 
-0.0280 
(-3.12) 
-0.0723 
(-5.60) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Hosp. RNs AJl RNs ControlRN 
metrop. 
size (7) 
region (8) yes yes yes 
quarter (32) 
R2 0.162 0.185 0.208 
n 17,296 24,345 127,831 
LPNs 
yes 
0.180 
6,119 
Control LPN 
yes 
0.259 
341,365 
Aides Control A 
yes yes 
0.278 0.186 
20,166 38,689 
Data are from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files for October 
1985 through December 1993. Dependent variable is the log of the real wage (weekly earnings divided 
by hours, in December 1993 dollars). Separate regressions are estimated for each nursing group and the 
respective control groups. In addition to coefficients shown, all regressions include dummies for 
metropolitan area size (7), region (8), and quarter (32). Variables are defined in the text. T-ratios are 
shown in parentheses. 
coverage, male (for the nursing regressions only), race (black and other nonwhite; 
white is the reference group), part-time status (less than 35 hours per week), sector 
(federal, state, or local, with private the reference group), marital status (married 
with spouse present and ever married without spouse present, with never married 
the reference group), number of own children ages 17 or below in household (1, 2, 
3, and 4 or more, with no children the reference group; male RNs are included in 
the reference group among women with no children), Census region (8 dummies 
for 9 regions), labor market size (7 dummies, with non-urban state areas the 
reference group), and 32 quarter dummies (with 1985:4 the reference group). The 
nursing but not the control group regressions include dummy variables for 
employment in a hospital, nursing home, or selected health practitioner's office 
(most of the nurses in this group are employed in physician offices), with other 
location of employment the omitted reference group. 
As expected, RNs in hospitals are awarded considerably higher wages than RNs 
with similar characteristic outside of hospitals, reflecting both unmeasured skill 
differences and wage premiums for job disamenities (e.g., night shift and weekend 
work). RNs employed in hospitals realize a 20.1 percent wage premium relative to 
RNs employed in nursing homes, and a 24.7 percent premium relative to those in 
the offices of physicians and other health practitioners. Consistent with much of 
the literature, union-nonunion wage differentials among RNs are relatively small, 
with only a 2.9 percent wage differential between RNs covered and not covered by 
collective bargaining agreements. 14 
14 AJl percentage wage differentials are approximated by [exp( f3)- 1]100, where f3 is the logarith­
mic differential between the two groups under comparison [Giles (1982) compares alternative approxi­
mation methods]. Estimated union wage premiums are highly similar when membership rather than 
coverage is included as the unionization variable. 
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Black RNs have wage rates 10.3 percent lower than among white nurses with 
similar measured characteristics, a racial differential somewhat larger than that 
among female workers economy-wide. Prior studies (e.g., Mennemeyer and 
Gaumer, 1983; Link, 1988; and Lehrer et al., 1991) have found small racial gaps 
or even a black wage advantage. These studies have utilized older data or narrower 
samples, and have not included as detailed region and city size controls. Note that 
within-nursing returns to schooling are small, as opposed to the total rate of return 
seen for the broad control group. 15 RNs employed by the federal government (3.0 
percent of all RNs), state government (5.7 percent), and local government (8.2 
percent) realize wage differentials of 3.9, 2.4, and - 2.2 percent, respectively, 
relative to the 83.1 percent of RNs employed by private-sector employers. 
There are important differences between RN and non-RN wage determination. 
In contrast to the large gender wage differentials observed economy-wide, male 
RNs realize wage rates not significantly different from female RNs (the point 
estimate implies a 1.6 percent difference). Also in contrast to evidence for the 
labor market as a whole, there is no wage penalty associated with part-time 
employment, with part-time RNs displaying a small (2.3 percent) wage 
advantage. 16 And unlike the control group of women, for whom the presence of 
children is likely to be a proxy for occupational skill level and past investments in 
human capital, female RNs with children suffer no wage disadvantage relative to 
male RNs and female RNs without children. 
Not shown in Table 3 are the coefficients on the quarterly dummies. Fig. 2 
provides a diagram that charts the quarterly dummies or logarithmic wage changes 
from 1985:4 through 1993:4 (with 1985:4 = 0), for hospital RNs (n = 17,296), the 
control group of college educated women (n = 127,831), and all employed 
non-student U.S. wage and salary females ( n  = 674,281) and males ( n  = 724,970) 
ages 18 and over (the specification for the economy-wide groups are identical to 
that for the RN control group, except for the addition of broad occupation and 
industry dummies). The real wages of hospital RNs, following control for measur­
able characteristics, rose 0.174 log points (19.0 percent) between 1985:4 and 
1993:4. By contrast, the control group of college educated women realized real 
15 As is typical of occupation-specific studies, one obtains a small coefficient on schooling that 
measures only within-occupation and not total returns to schooling. For years through 1991, the CPS 
provides information on years of schooling completed, but not degree. Beginning in 1992, the CPS 
provides information on type of degree completed. Data for 1992-93 indicates that RNs with 
bachelor's degrees earn significantly more than RNs with associate and diploma degrees, although the 
differential (assuming a two year difference in schooling) implies a rate of return to schooling for RNs 
with bachelor's degrees about half as large as that realized by the general labor force (i.e., similar to the 
differential implied by the years of schooling coefficients shown in Table 3). Studies examining returns 
to nursing education include Mennemeyer and Gaumer (1983), Link (1988), and Lehrer et al. (1991). 
16 Part-time nurses are less likely to receive health insurance, pension, and other non-wage benefits 
than are full-time nurses. The same is also true, however, among the control group samples where a 
large part-time wage penalty is observed. 
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Fig. 2. RN and control group log wage changes, 1985:4-1993:4. Data are from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files for October 1 985 through December 1993. 
Sample sizes are 17,296, 127,831, 674,281, and 724,970 for hospital RNs, the RN control group, all 
females, and all males, respectively. The diagram presents logarithmic wage changes from 1985:4 
through 1993:4, following control for measurable wage determinants. Shown are the coefficients on 
quarterly dummy variables (1985:4 
= 0) from separate log wage equations for the four worker groups. 
Full results for hospital RNs and the RN control group are reported in Table 3. Variables included, in 
addition to quarter, are years of schooling, potential experience and its square, union coverage, marital 
status (2), race (2), part-time, public sector (3), children (4), region (8), and metropolitan area size (7). 
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wage growth of 0.040 log points. The 0.134 log point (14.3 percent) increase in 
hospital RN relative to control group wages, conditional on characteristics, is 
similar to the 13.4 percent increase (from 1 . 12 to 1 .27) in the relative mean wage 
ratios, not conditional on characteristics, presented previously in Table 1 ,  line 2. 
Wage growth for workers economy-wide was of course slower during this period. 
For all employed women, real wage growth from 1985:4 through 1993:4, condi­
tional measured characteristics, was only 2.3 percent (0.023 log points), whereas 
real wages for men fell by 4.7 percent ( - 0.048 log points). 17 
5. Testing for monopsony effects on wages: Specification and evidence 
5.1. Specification 
A two-step estimation procedure is used to test for monopsony effects on 
wages. We subsequently report results from alternative specifications of the 
two-step model, as well as results obtained from a single-step estimation proce­
dure. 
In order to control for differences across labor markets in cost of living, 
opportunity costs of labor, unobserved labor quality, working conditions, and 
area-specific amenities and disamenities, we compare nursing wages to those of 
selected control groups. In the first -step, · we estimate area-specific nursing wage 
differentials for 252 ·areas, where the wage differential represents the difference 
between the nursing and non-nursing wage in that labor market, conditional on 
measurable characteristics that vary at the individual level within labor markets. 
The monopsony model predicts that the nursing differential should be lowest in 
the least competitive markets, with the differential increasing with respect to 
hospital density and market size. In the second stage, therefore, we examine 
whether the nursing/non-nursing area differentials (n = 252) estimated in the 
first-step vary systematically with labor market characteristics that vary across but 
not within areas; specifically, labor market size, hospital density, and region. 
An important assumption of this analysis is that unmeasured differences across 
markets in cost of living, labor quality, working conditions, and area amenities are 
properly controlled for to the extent that these unmeasured wage determinants 
affect nursing personnel and the control groups in a similar manner. Such an 
assumption is reasonable since the control groups selected provide an opportunity 
cost measure of the long-run alternatives available to nursing personnel, and cost 
of living and area amenities should be roughly similar for nurses and the control 
groups. Moreover, the control group wage (conditional on measured characteris-
17 Standard errors attaching to the quarterly dummies are approximately 0.017 in the hospital RN, 
0.010 in the RN control group, and 0.004 in both the national female and male regressions. 
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tics) need not provide a perfect measure of the relative wage; rather, our 
methodology is appropriate as long as errors in the measure of relative wages are 
not systematically correlated with market size or hospital density. 
We have no a priori expectation of the direction of bias associated with 
unmeasured labor quality. It is fair to assume that worker quality among both 
nursing and non-nursing personnel is higher in larger markets. Our measure of 
relative wages properly controls for unmeasured labor quality if labor quality 
increases with respect to market size at a similar rate for both groups. If nursing 
quality rises faster with respect to size than does quality of the control group, then 
our test would be biased toward the finding of monopsony (i.e., of rising relative 
nursing wages with respect to size). If nursing quality rises more slowly, our test is 
biased against the finding of monopsony. Random measurement error in the 
relative wage variable does not bias coefficients since the measurement error will 
be on the left-hand-side of the regression equation. It does, of course, lead to a 
lower goodness of fit for the second-step equation. 
More formally, the first-step log wage equations are pooled cross-sections for 
the 1985-93 period, run separately for RNs, LPNs, and aides, each paired with 
their appropriate control group. They take the form: 
ln Wirk = a +  I: {3jXJirk + L:flqQUARTERqr + I:Fq NURSE · QUARTERqr 
( 1 ) 
where In Wirk is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings (usual weekly earnings 
divided by usual hours worked per week) of worker i in time period t in labor 
market k (where k = 1 ,  . . .  ,252); a is the control group intercept for area k = 1 in 
1985:4; NURSE is a dummy variable equal to 1 for nursing personnel, X includes 
individual-specific variables (indexed by j)  affecting nursing and control group 
wages, with {3j the attaching coefficients; QUARTER represents dummies for the 
quarters (q) 1986:1-1993:4 with flq measuring the quarterly movement of 
control group wages and rq the movement of nursing relative to control group 
wages; and eirk is the error term. 
AREA is a set of 252 dummy variables corresponding to the 202 CMSAjMSAs 
and 50 non-urban state areas, with 'Pk ( k  = 2, . . .  ,252) representing the area wage 
differentials for the control group relative to the omitted reference area, and c/>k 
(k 
= 1 ,  . . .  ,252) measuring the 252 area-specific wage differential for nurses 
relative to the control group in each area. The </>k, measuring the relative nursing 
to control group wage by area, conditional on measured characteristics and 
assuming a common wage structure, is then utilized as the dependent variable in 
the second-step equation. 
Variables included in X are years of schooling; years of potential experience 
and its square; and dummies for union coverage, marital status (2), part-time 
status, race (2), public-sector status (3), and children in household (4). These are 
variables that vary among individuals within labor markets. Excluded are variables 
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that vary across but not within labor markets (e.g., region, market size, number of 
employers). 
A second-step weighted least squares (WLS) regression is then estimated with 
the area-specific nursing wage differentials 4>k as the dependent variable (n = 252). 
Specifically, we estimate: 
4>k = C/> + 0 ln(HOSP jSQMI) k + [t/fsSlZEsk + ttTRAININGk 
(2) 
Here, 4>k is the nursing differential for area k estimated in the first-step regression, 
C/> is the intercept; ln(HOSP jSQMI)k is the natural logarithm of the number of 
hospitals per square mile and e its coefficient; SIZEsk are dummy variables 
representing seven metropolitan area size groups (indexed by s; non-urban state 
areas are the reference group) and t/Js are the corresponding coefficients; TRAIN­
INGk the ratio of trainees to total personnel with it its coefficient; REGIONrk are 
eight dummies representing the nine Census regions, with r the region coeffi­
cients; and vk is a random error term. Eq. (2) is estimated by WLS, using the 
square root of the nurse plus non-nurse sample sizes within each labor market as 
weights. 18 
Coefficients from the first-step regression (Eq. (1)) capture within-area effects 
owing to variation across individuals in measurable characteristics, with fixed area 
wage effects measured by coefficients on the area dummy variables. Differences in 
area nursing wage differentiais are explained in turn (Eq. (2)) by hospital density, 
area size, and other variables that vary across but not within areas. The monop­
sony model predicts that e, the coefficient on the log of hospitals per square mile 
will be positive, at least for hospital RNs. It also implies that t/Js, the coefficients 
on metropolitan area size, will be positive and increasing with respect to size. That 
is, relative to the smallest markets (i.e., the reference group of non-urban state 
groups) where relative nursing wages are most likely to be depressed by monop­
sony, larger areas should provide higher relative wages. The variable TRAINING 
is included to capture the presence of university and other training hospitals. The 
net effect of TRAINING cannot be predicted, since such hospitals may be 
associated with differences in input and output mix, nursing quality, and labor 
supply. 
From the first-step regressions, we obtain area specific differentials measuring 
the log wage differential between nursing personnel and their respective control 
groups. These coefficients make up the dependent variable in the second-step 
WLS equation, seen in Table 4. The unweighted means of the nursejnon-nurse 
log wage differentials (the ¢/s) across areas (with standard deviations and 
interquartile ranges in brackets) are: 0.406 [0. 1 1 1 ,  0.133] for hospital RNs, 0.361 
18 Dickens and Ross (1984) outline a similar two-step procedure intended to avoid the downward bias 
in standard errors that accompanies single-step estimation matching grouped to individual data. 
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[0.103, 0.132] for all RNs, 0.178 [0.136, 0.136] for LPNs, and 0.008 [0.104, 0.115] 
for aides. The coefficients are estimated with a high degree of precision, except in 
the smaller MSAs. In the combined hospital RN and control group wage equation, 
for example, all estimates of the differential are positive, while 237 of the 252 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. Below, we focus 
primary attention on RNs within hospitals because hospital employees are most 
likely to be directly affected by the monopsony power of hospitals, because labor 
supply should be least elastic among nursing groups requiring the most extensive 
and specific (i.e., non-transferable) training, and because this is the group among 
whom shortages have been observed. 
5.2. Evidence for registered nurses 
Table 4 provides alternative second-step WLS results for hospital RNs. The 
results in column (1) correspond to the model as specified in the previous section. 
No support is found for the thesis of monopsonistic or oligopsonistic power in 
nursing labor markets. The monopsony model predicts that relative RN wages 
should be positively related to the density of employers, as measured by the log of 
hospitals per square mile (ln(HOSP jSQMI)). The coefficient on ln(HOSP jSQMI), 
however, is close to zero and has a large standard error. This result is subsequently 
found for all variants of the basic model and for all nursing groups. 19 
The monopsony model also leads to the prediction that the coefficients on the 
SIZE dummies should be positive and increasing; that is, the lowest relative wage 
rates in the non-urban markets and increasing relative wages as market size 
increases. We do find that the relative wage differential is slightly higher (3.4 
percent) in the smallest metropolitan areas (100-200 thousand population) than in 
the non-urban state groups, but this difference is not statistically significant. But 
contrary to the monopsony hypothesis, relative wages are higher in the non-urban 
state areas than in all other city size categories, and the differential decreases as 
metropolitan area size increases. For example, relative RN to control group wage 
premiums are estimated to be about 14.5 percent lower in the largest metropolitan 
19 In results not shown, we also include the log of the number of hospitals, without standardization 
for physical area (square miles). We estimate two hospital coefficients, one for the 50 non-urban state 
groups and one for the 202 CMSA/MSAs. Again, no support is found for monopsony. Ideally, we 
would like to have had a Herfindahl measure of hospital concentration by area, which would reflect 
both the number and size of hospitals. Given the complete absence of a statistical relationship between 
relative nursing wages and hospital density (or number of hospitals) and, as shown below, a negative 
relationship between relative wages and labor market size, it is unlikely that the Herfindahl index or 
other measures of hospital concentration could account for much of the variation in relative nursing 
wages. Dranove, Shanley, and Simon (1992), however, in their analysis of the " medical arms race" 
thesis, show that their results can be sensitive to alternative measures of the extent of the market. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of area relative wage differentials for hospital RNs, alternative second-step WLS and 
single-step regression results 
( 1 )  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Size 2: 0.0332 0.0412 0.0341 0.0347 0.0458 
100K-200K ( 1.40) (1 .99) (1.20) ( 1 .42) (2.40) 
Size 3: - 0.0454 - 0.0532 - 0.0398 - 0.0469 - 0.0673 
200K-300K ( - 1.84) ( - 2.48) ( - 1.35) ( - 1.88) ( - 3.56) 
Sizc4: - 0.0341 - 0.0435 - 0.0541 - 0.0428 - 0.0421 
300K-500K ( - 1.36) ( - 1.99) ( - 1.80) ( - 1.79) ( -2.41) 
Size 5: - 0.0541 - 0.0599 - 0.0583 - 0.0495 - 0.0517 
500K-1 M  (- 2.14) (-2.71) ( - 1.93) (-2.18) ( - 3.33) 
Size 6: - 0.0540 - 0.0594 - 0.0624 - 0.0533 - 0.0546 
1M-2M ( - 1.77) ( - 2.24) ( - 1.72) ( - 2.01) ( - 3.20) 
Size 7: -0.1037 -0.1064 -0.1157 - 0.0981 -0.1149 
2M-5M (- 3.37) ( - 3.97) (-3.15) (- 3.70) ( - 6.88) 
Size 8: -0.1571 -0.1435 -0.1644 - 0.1495 -0.1648 
5M and over ( - 3.91) ( -4. 10) (-3.43) ( -4.37) ( - 8.97) 
ln(POP) - 0.0412 
( - 5.98) 
ln(Hosp jSqMi) 0.0035 0.0151 0.0110 0.0024 0.0018 - 0.0127 
(0.34) (1 .40) (1.22) (0.19) (0.19) ( - 2.37) 
Training 0.0934 0.1861 0.4058 0.2119 - 0.0357 0.4780 
(0.21) (0.43) (1.04) (0.40) (-0.09) (1.70) 
Region (8) yes yes yes yes yes yes 
" 252 252 252 252 252 145,127 
R2 0.268 0.269 0.310 0.232 0.349 0.218 
F 4.945 . 6.699 . 3.827 • 5.379 . 19.942 • 
• Signifies that the F statistic permits rejection at the 0.05 level of the null that the size coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero. T-ratios are in parentheses. In columns ( 1)-(5), the unit of observation is area, 
with 50 non-urban state groups plus 202 MSA/CMSAs. The dependent variable is c/Jk, the first-step 
regression estimate of the area-specific log wage differential between the nursing group and the control 
group, conditional on person-specific variables included in the first-step equation. Column ( 1 )  is for the 
specification shown in the text (the dependent variable is obtained from Eq. ( 1 )  and Eq. (2) results are 
shown above), with estimation by weighted least squares (WLS) using /n as weights, with n the joint 
nurse and control group sample size in each area; column (2) is identical to (1), except that the log of 
population rather than market size dummies are included (a non-urban state group dummy times 
ln(POP) is also included); results in column (3) usc a different dependent variable, obtained from a 
first-step equation allowing separate RN and control group coefficients on all variables, with /n as 
weights; (4) is identical to (1), except the first-step equation is estimated for only the approximate 
half-sample of workers in their second year in the CPS; (5) is identical to ( 1 ), except weighting is by 
the inverse of the error variances attaching to the dependent variable from the first-step estimates. 
Column (6) provides partial regression results from a single-step OLS log wage regression including all 
hospital RNs and the RN control group. In columns ( 1 )-(5), eight region dummies are included to 
account for the nine Census regions (these are not included in the first-step). The single-step regression 
in (6) includes region and all other variables shown in Table 3, with common slopes on the control 
variables, plus nurse interactions with the quarterly dummies, hospital density, training, and the market 
size dummies. 
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areas than in the smallest markets. The magnitude of most market size coefficients 
is about - 0.05. Although log wage differentials of about 5 percent are nontrivial, 
they are rather small as compared to the approximate 0.40 log differential found 
between RNs and their control group, even following control for measurable 
characteristics. The F statistic testing for the joint significance of the market size 
dummies is significant at standard levels (F(7,234) = 4.945). Market size does 
appear to matter, but in a way opposite from that predicted by monopsony. 
Also included as a control variable is TRAINING, measuring the ratio of 
trainees to total employment. As discussed previously, this variable is likely to 
proxy factors both positively and negatively correlated with nursing wage rates. 
The net effect is close to zero. We do not know if the individual factors with 
which TRAINING is correlated (e.g., skill intensity, labor supply) are individually 
not important, or whether they are important but offset each other. Finally, wages 
for hospital RNs relative to the control group are similar across most Census 
regions (we do not present these results); the regional dummies are not jointly 
significant at standard significance levels (F(8,234) = 0.962). Coefficients on the 
hospital density and market size variables are highly similar when region dummies 
are excluded. 
We next examine the robustness of our basic finding. Table 4 provides five 
alternative sets of estimates of the relationship between relative wages of hospital 
RNs, hospital density, and market size. In column (2), we substitute the log of 
population in an area for the CMSA/MSA market size dummies (we also include 
but do not show a non-urban state group dummy times the log of population). 
Consistent with our findings using size dummies, we obtain a negative (and 
statistically significant) coefficient on the log population variable. 
The next set of estimates, shown in column (3), are based on an alternative 
specification of the first-step wage equation that allows for separate coefficients 
for the nursing and non-nursing groups on all variables, in addition to the 
inclusion of 251 dummies for area and 252 nursing-area interaction dummies. This 
specification produces coefficient estimates equivalent to that obtained by running 
separate wage equations for nurses and the control group, each with a set of area 
dummies. The coefficients on the 252 nursing-area interaction dummies are then 
employed as the dependent variable in the second-step regression (this is equiva­
lent to subtracting control group area dummies from nursing area dummies using 
separate wage equations). This differential measure reflects the relative ' ' wage 
gradiant" by area for nurses relative to the control group. That is, after allowing 
for separate national wage structures for nurses and non-nurses, the relative wage 
measure for each area represents the log wage differential for nurses in that labor 
market relative to a reference market, minus the log wage differential for 
non-nurses in that market relative to the same reference market. As expected, these 
wage differential measures are highly correlated with our previous measure, which 
represented area-specific relative wage differentials between nurses and the control 
group in each labor market (the simple correlation of the two measures for hospital 
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RNs is 0.893). Qualitative and quantitative results from the second-step regression 
using this alternative area wage differential measure (column 3) are highly similar 
to our preferred model presented in column 1 .  
An additional concern results from the sampling design of the CPS, wherein 
individuals are potentially included in the survey during the same month in two 
consecutive years. This implies that (a maximum of half) the individual observa­
tions in a given year are not independent of observations in adjacent years, leading 
to standard errors that are biased downward. This bias is not a serious concern, 
since our results clearly reject the hypothesis of a positive relationship between 
relative nursing wages and hospital density or market size. In order to avoid this 
problem, we provide an identical analysis as before, except that we include 
individuals only in their second year in the CPS (rotation group 8), thus retaining a 
representative sample but eliminating all double observations on individuals. 
These estimates are shown in column (4) of Table 4. As expected, point estimates 
are similar to those shown previously, but standard errors are moderately larger. 
Column (5) presents results from a model equivalent to that shown in column 
( 1 ), except that rather than weighting by .;n, we follow the suggestion of 
Saxonhouse (1976), who shows that weighting by the inverse of the error variance 
attached to 4>k from Eq. (1) is appropriate when regression parameters are used as 
a dependent variable (this assumes observations are independent). That is, weights 
are proportional to the precision with which each area's wage differential is 
estimated. Results using this alternative weighting scheme are highly similar to 
those obtained when weighting by .;n (or, in results now shown, using OLS). 
In column (6), we present the hospital density and market size coefficients 
based on results from a single-step log wage equation estimated with individual 
worker observations ( n  = 145,127), which includes the grouped area data and 
appropriate interaction terms with the size dummies. This provides similar infor­
mation to that provided by the two-step procedure, but standard errors are biased 
downward rather substantially owing to matching grouped to individual data (e.g., 
Kloek, 1981; and Dickens and Ross, 1 984). Shown in column (6) are coefficients 
on the log of hospital density variable and the nursing-size dummies from the 
single-step estimation. As expected, point estimates are similar to those shown 
previously, but t-ratios are substantially higher due to the downward bias in 
standard errors. 
In results not shown, we estimated both first-and second-step models separately 
for the periods 1985-89 and 1990-93. Splitting the sample reduces substantially 
the number of observations within labor markets from which we estimate relative 
wage differentials, but does allow us to test for differences between periods. The 
earlier years correspond closely to a period of sustained reports of nursing 
shortages, while during more recent years there has been an easing of reported 
shortages, due in no small part to the significant wage increases that have 
occurred. Hence, results from the later period may differ significantly from the 
earlier period, or lead us to overlook evidence supporting monopsony for the 
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earlier period. The pattern of size coefficients was similar during the two periods, 
however; no evidence for monopsony is found in either period. 
The results in Table 4 clearly reject the monopsony model prediction of a 
positive relationship of relative RN wages with the number of employers and 
market size. The competitive labor market model would predict an absence of a 
relationship between nursing relative wages and market size, following control for 
other wage determinants. Neither the competitive model nor the monopsony model 
provides an obvious explanation for the negative relationship evident in Table 4. 
Taking the estimates at face value, the implication is that RNs fare worse in large 
urban areas, relative to alternative employment opportunities. Lower relative 
wages in large markets would be consistent with a finding that nursing shortages 
are most severe in large rather than small markets. 
If we assume that decreasing relative wages with respect to market size reflects 
an equilibrium differential, then the more likely explanation is the presence of 
unmeasured worker and job quality attributes correlated with market size. If 
unmeasured nursing labor quality rises more slowly with respect to size than does 
unmeasured non-nursing quality, our test is biased against the finding of monop­
sony. This latter pattern would help explain why relative nursing wages decline 
with market size. Given the magnitude of the negative relationship, however, the 
bias from relative differences in unmeasured ability would have to be implausibly 
large for us to have falsely rejected the monopsony outcome were it in fact 
present. That is, unmeasured nursing skills would have to rise with respect to 
market size far more slowly than do non-nursing labor skills in order for us not 
only to fail to find. evidence for monopsony, but also find a pattern of results the 
opposite of that predicted by monopsony. While we are confident that such a large 
bias is not present, we explore in Section 6 alternative tests of monopsony. 
5.3. Evidence for licensed practical nurses and nursing aides 
In contrast to hospital RNs, sustained and systematic shortages of LPNs and 
nursing aides have not been evident. Moreover, the extent of occupation-specific 
training is substantially less for LPNs and aides than for RNs; hence occupational 
mobility is relatively greater than among RNs. For these reasons, monopsonistic 
wage-employment outcomes are less likely to be evident among LPNs and aides 
than among RNs. In order to provide a check and comparison on our hospital RN 
results, we estimate our two-step model for all RNs, LPNs, and aides. As before, 
this model measures the relationship between the labor-market specific wages of 
each nursing group relative to their selected control group and hospital density and 
market size. These results are presented in Table 5. To facilitate a comparison with 
hospital RNs, we present the second-step results for this group, as previously 
shown in Table 4, column (1). 
As expected, the results for all RNs largely mirror those for hospital RNs. This 
is not surprising given that hospitals are the primary location of employment for 
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RNs (most young RNs are employed in hospitals; this proportion declines steadily 
with age). Results in Table 5 indicate that the relative wages of neither LPNs nor 
nursing aides are significantly related to hospital density. These results also are 
expected since hospital employment is relatively less important a location of 
employment for LPNs and aides than for RNs. The relative wages for LPNs tend 
to decline moderately with respect to market size, but the magnitude of the size 
differentials is small and not quite statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
(F(7,231) = 2 .004). 20 Aides tend to have slightly higher relative wages in larger 
markets (except for the largest cities), but these differences are not close to being 
statistically significant (F(7,234) = 1 .349). In short, we find no evidence that 
relative wages for LPNs or aides follow a pattern that would support the 
hypothesis of monopsonistic power. Of course, such a finding would be surprising, 
given that no such evidence could be found for RNs. 
6. Additional evidence on monopsony and the market for nurses 
In this section, we examine alternative implications of the monopsony model. 
We estimate differences across the market size categories in union wage premi­
ums, in slopes of earnings-experience profiles, in wage dispersion, and in the 
employment mix (for previous efforts along these lines, see, among others, 
Adamache and Sloan, 1982). In order to conserve space, we present results only 
for hospital RNs and their control group, since monopsonistic outcomes should be 
most evident among hospital RNs. 
Unions may be a countervailing force against monopsony power. If so, we 
would expect union wage premiums for hospital RNs to be relatively largest in 
small, less competitive markets. A problem in testing this thesis is that wage 
standardization by labor unions leads to larger union premiums in small markets 
not just for RNs, but also among the general labor force (Hirsch and Addison, 
1986, Ch. 5). It is necessary, therefore, to compare the size pattern of union wage 
premiums for RNs with the pattern for workers in the RN control group. 
We estimate separate log wage equations for hospital RNs and the control 
group of college-educated female workers in selected non-health occupations. 
Included in the regressions are our set of standard control variables, a union 
coverage dummy, and the interactions of union coverage with size dummies for 
the seven groups of metropolitan areas. The union coverage coefficient (shown in 
Table 6, lines 1a  and 1b, column 1) provides an estimate of the union premium in 
20 There are no LPNs in our sample in three small MSAs. If the hospital RN market were 
monopsonistic but the LPN market competitive, one might predict a substitution away from RNs and 
toward LPNs, and higher wages for LPNs, in small markets. If long-run market supply curves for LPNs 
are highly elastic, however, demand shifts will have little effect on relative wages. 
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Table 5 
Second-step WLS regression results, determinants of area relative wage differentials for 
personnel 
Hosp. RNs AJl RNs LPNs Aides 
Size 2: 0.0332 0.0453 - 0.0398 0.0 95 
100K-200K ( 1.40) (2.04) ( - 1 .41) (0.45) 
Size 3: - 0.0454 - 0.0417  - 0.0372 0.0439 
200K-300K ( - 1.84) ( - 1.80) ( - 1.24) (2.00) 
Size 4: - 0.0341 - 0.0291 0.0120 0.0325 
300K-500K ( - 1.36) ( - 1.24) (0.40) (1.62) 
Size 5: - 0.0541 - 0.0410 - 0.0443 0.041 1  
500K-1M ( -2.14) ( - 1.72) ( - 1 .46) (2.11) 
Size 6: - 0.0540 - 0.0490 - 0.0460 0.0404 
1M-2M (- 1.77) ( - 1 .71) ( - 1.24) ( 1.76) 
Size 7: -0.1037 - 0.0882 - 0.0730 0.0461 
2M-5M ( - 3.37) ( - 3.05) ( - 1.93) (1.97) 
Size 8: -0.1571 - 0.1347 - 0.1270 0.0248 
5M and over ( - 3.91) (- 3.57) ( - 2.57) (0.81) 
ln(Hosp/SqMi) 0.0035 0.0070 0.0021 - 0.0090 
(0.34) (0.72) (0.17) (- 1.05) 
Training 0.0934 0.1908 0.1303 - 1 .0756 
(0.21) (0.45) (0.23) ( - 2.71) 
Region (8) yes yes yes yes 
n 252 252 249 252 
R2 0.268 0.261 0.183 0.120 
F 4.945 • 5.172 
• 
2.004 1.349 
nu rsing 
' Signifies that the F statistic permits rejection at the 0.05 level of the null that the size coefficients are 
jointly equal to zero. T-ratios in parentheses. See notes to Table 4. Estimation procedure is identical to 
that in column (1) of Table 4, as explained in the text (Eqs. ( 1)  and (2)). The unit of observation is 
area, with 50 non-urban state groups and 202 MSA/CMSAs. Three MSA cells had no LPNs in the 
sample. The dependent variable is the first-step regression estimate of the area-specific log wage 
differential between the nursing group and the control group, conditional on person-specific variables 
included in the first-step equation. Estimation is by weighted least squares (WLS) using .Jn as weights, 
with n the joint nurse and control group sample size in each area. 
the non-urban state areas, while the coverage-size interaction terms measure the 
difference in the premium between the non-urban areas and the corresponding 
metropolitan size categories. Among hospital RNs, a relatively larger union 
premium is found for the rural reference group than most of the metropolitan area 
groups (the premium is 0.03 in  the non-urban state areas, while interaction terms 
are negative), consistent with the monopsony prediction. Union wage effects 
overall are small (and often negative) and have large standard errors. The null that 
the coverage-size interaction terms are jointly zero is marginally rejected. Stan­
dard errors would of course be even larger were we to use a two-step estimation 
Table 6 
Area size differences in union wage premiums, slopes of experience profiles, wage dispersion, and the RN-labor mix 
Non-urban state Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5 Size 6 Size 7 Size 8 F 
reference group 
1a. Union Coverage 0.0296 - 0.0570 - 0.0100 - 0.0328 - 0. 0200 - 0.0585 0.0257 - 0.0168 2.602 • 
and Size * Coverage: (2.48) ( - 1.64) ( - 0.30) ( - 1.36) ( - 0.93) ( - 2.38) (1.52) ( - 1.07) 
Hospital RNs 
lb. Union Coverage 0.1063 - 0.0147 - 0.0367 - 0.0403 - 0.0390 - 0.0532 - 0.0562 - 0.0351 7.441 • 
and Size * Coverage: (17.75) ( - 0.91) ( -2.53) ( - 2.97) ( -3.88) ( - 4.61) ( - 6.38) ( - 4.27) 
RN Control Group 
2a. ln(Experience) and 0.0284 0.0010 0.0105 0.0118 0.0127 - 0.0031 0.0014 - 0.0007 1.137 
Size * ln(Experience): (7.84) (0.13) (1.22) (1.46) (1.90) ( - 0.42) (0.28) ( - 0.13) 
Hospital RNs 
2b. ln(Experience) and 0.0414 - 0.0023 - 0. 0033 - 0.0047 - 0.0013 0.0030 - 0.0019 - 0.0016 0.781 
Size * ln(Experience): (24.82) ( - 0.56) ( -0.87) ( - 1 .30) ( - 0.49) (1.03) ( - 0.85) ( - 0.72) 
RN Control Group 
3a. C.V.-Hospital RNs 9.95 8.92 9.70 9.57 10.59 10.00 10.05 10.20 -
3b. C.V.-RN Controls 17.54 17.51 17.49 17.45 17.45 17.33 17.34 17.34 -
4. RNsj All Personnel 0.225 0.243 0.251 0.244 0.249 0.250 0.252 0.248 -
Regression estimates in lines la-lb and 2a-2b are based on CPS micro log wage regressions for hospital RNs and for the RN control group, with a full set of 
control variables included, as shown in Table 3. In lines la-1b and 2a-2b, the coefficient shown under the column headed as non-urban reference group is 
either union coverage or ln(Experience); the coefficients under the columns headed Size 2 through Size 8 are marginal effects relative to the reference group, 
based on interactions of size dummies and either union coverage or ln(Experience). Each F statistic in the last column tests the null hypothesis that the set of 7 
interaction terms shown on the row are jointly equal to zero, with • indicating that the null is rejected at the 0.05 significance level. The coefficients of 
variation shown in lines 3a-3b are based on the specification shown in Table 3 (absent size dummies), with micro log wage equations estimated separately by 
size category. Line 4 shows the ratio of RNsj All Personnel in hospitals, based on data from Hospital Statistics, 1989-90 edition. 
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similar to that used previously to examine relative nursing wage differentials. 21 
For the control group of female workers, union wage premiums are much larger 
than among RNs, but we observe a similar area size pattern, with lower premiums 
in urban areas of all sizes. The evidence on union wage premiums does not allow 
us to reject the hypothesis that unions are a countervailing force to monopsony in 
small labor markets, but neither does it provide clear-cut support for this hypothe­
sis. 
Monopsony power is most likely to be evident among relatively older workers 
who are less mobile due to community ties, marriage, children, occupation-specific 
skills, and rates of return to investment in migration and training that diminish 
with respect to age. In a competitive market where workers are mobile across 
employers (but not labor markets), nursing personnel should receive a wage 
approximating their marginal revenue product. But in a monopsonistic labor 
market, immobile older workers are less likely to receive competitive wages, and 
thus wage-experience profiles should be flatter. Lehrer et al. (1991, Table 5) 
examine in some detail earnings profiles and returns to education by experience 
group among Illinois nurses. They find little difference in the ·slopes of earnings 
profiles between RNs in  metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. As in the case of 
union wage premiums, it is important that differences in slopes of profiles across 
different size markets among nursing personnel be compared to similar evidence 
for non-health related workers. 
Table 6 (lines 2a and 2b) provides coefficient estimates on a log(experience) 
variable, and log(experience) interacted with the seven metropolitan size dummies, 
estimated separately in wage equations for hospital RNs (line 2a) and for the 
corresponding control group (line 2b). The log of experience is included in place 
of experience and experience squared in order to facilitate easy comparison across 
city sizes, yet still permit a concave log wage-experience profile. Looking first at 
line· 2b, significant differences among the control group are not found across the 
size categories in the slopes of experience profiles (the null of equivalent slopes 
cannot be rejected). As predicted by the monopsony model, however, wage growth 
among RNs, as proxied by the slope of the experience profile, appears somewhat 
larger in small urban markets than in rural labor markets (line 2a). Standard errors 
are very large, however, and there is no difference in slopes between rural and the 
large metropolitan area markets. As with the prior evidence on union wage 
21 We also estimated a specification that includes the interaction of union coverage with hospital 
density. Counter to the monopsony model, which predicts that union-nonunion wage differentials 
should be larger in less competitive markets, we obtain a positive coefficient on the coverage-hospital 
interaction term. 
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premiums, evidence in support or in opposition to the hypothesis of monopsony 
effects on wage growth is not clear-cut. 22 
If married nurses with spouse present are relatively less mobile geographically 
than are never married and previously married nurses, than the wage penalty 
associated with low mobility should be greatest in small markets where there is the 
least competition. In work not shown, we estimate a wage equation in which we 
interact marital status with both the log of hospital density and the market size 
dummies. Neither the marriage-hospital interaction nor the set of marriage-size 
interaction terms are close to statistical significance, although signs are largely as 
predicted. 
The presence of monopsonistic power by employers might permit the exercise 
of wage discrimination (i.e., bidding up a labor supply curve). This should be 
evinced by greater wage dispersion among nurses with similar productivities 
(characteristics). 23 To examine this thesis, we estimate separate log wage regres­
sions for hospital RNs within each labor market size category. The coefficient of 
variation (100 times the standard deviation of the error term divided by the sample 
mean of the log wage) attaching to each equation provides a measure of the 
dispersion of wages standardized on measurable characteristics and indexed by the 
wage level (these are presented on line 3a of Table 6). Similar evidence is 
presented for the RN control group. Although monopsonistic wage discrimination 
might lead to greater dispersion in small than in large markets, differences by 
market size follow no clear pattern. The only outliers appear to be a relatively low 
C.V. among RNs in the smallest MSAs (Size 2) and a high C.V. in MSAs with 
populations 0.5-1 million (Size 5). Wage dispersion among the control group 
workers, standardized on characteristics, is highly similar across labor markets, 
although a tendency toward lower dispersion in larger markets is evident. If 
monopsony power among RNs exists, it does not appear to be exercised via 
individual-based wage discrimination. 
22 Because the proportion of RN employment in hospitals declines with age, the estimated slope of 
the earnings-experience profile among all RNs (without control for sector of employment) would be 
biased downward, owing to the movement of RNs from the higher wage hospital to lower wage 
non-hospital sector. The estimated slope of the hospital RN experience profile (shown in Table 6) will 
be biased upward (downward) if relatively more able (less able) experienced RNs remain in the 
hospital sector. The relatively flat cross-sectional earnings profiles observed for RNs are misleading, 
resulting from substantial upward profile shifts (i.e., vintage effects) for more recent cohorts. That is, 
cross-section profiles compare the earnings by experience across different birth cohorts, rather than 
following wage growth among given cohorts over time. Using a 21 year time-series cross-section of 
CPS files ( 1973-93), we estimate longitudinal profiles for various nursing cohorts. As expected, real 
wage growth for most cohorts of RNs has been substantially faster than that implied by the 
cross-section profile. 
23 A flatter experience profile lowers total wage dispersion. Here we examine whether there is greater 
within-cell wage dispersion, measured by dispersion following the control for experience and other 
wage related characteristics. 
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A final (albeit rather crude) test of the monopsony model utilizes information 
on factor mix in hospitals, or specifically, the ratio of RNs to total personnel. 24 As 
compared to outcomes in competitive markets, monopsony is predicted to produce 
both lower wages and lower relative use of RNs. As evident in line 4 of Table 6, 
the relative use of RNs is somewhat lower in non-urban hospitals, but varies little 
across hospitals in different size urban markets. 25 As was the case with differ­
ences in relative wages, union premiums, and the slopes of earnings profiles, small 
differences found between rural and small metropolitan markets are consistent 
with the monopsony model. Differences across urban areas of different SIZes, 
however, provide no evidence in support of the monopsony m?del. 
7. Conclusions 
The hypothesis of monopsony power in nursing labor markets is frequently 
used to explain reported shortages of hospital RNs. Although evidence (Sullivan, 
1989) has indicated that hospitals face upward sloping labor supply curves (a 
necessary condition for monopsony), this is not sufficient to establish monopsonis­
tic effects on employment and wages. Previous empirical studies examining more 
directly the effects of market structure on wages have reached conflicting conclu­
sions and obtained results that are often inconclusive. 
This study uses individual worker data from the Current Population Surveys for 
the period 1985-93 in order to examine the wages of hospital and non-hospital 
RNs, LPNs, and nursing aides, relative to alternative control groups of female 
non-health related workers. Labor markets are defined by individuals' location in 
one of 252 U.S. geographic areas - 202 metropolitan areas and 50 non-urban state 
groups. Little support is found for the monopsony model. Contrary to predictions 
of the monopsony model, the relative wages of nursing personnel are not related to 
hospital density and tend to decrease rather than increase with respect to labor 
market size. Additional evidence on union wage effects, slopes of wage-experi­
ence profiles, wage dispersion, and the employment of RNs relative to other 
hospital personnel provides little support for the view that monopsony power plays 
an important role in nursing labor markets. 
Important advantages of the study have been the ability to examine recent 
evidence on wage determination for large representative samples of the U.S. 
nursing workforce across labor markets of different size, as well as for large 
24 Robinson (1988) has examined this thesis in some detail (see footnote 3). The data on employment 
by area are taken from Hospital Statistics, 1989-90 edition. Results using an alternative measure of 
employment mix, the ratio of RNs to patient days, are highly similar to those shown. 
25 We do find that the usc of LPNs relative to all personnel (or patient days) declines with respect to 
market size. This is consistent with the thesis that hospitals in larger cities utilize more sophisticated 
technologies and have a relatively lower demand for LPNs. 
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economy-wide control groups. Despite the advantages of these data, the study has 
inherent limitations. A crucial assumption in the paper is that the use of control 
groups of female workers in non-health related occupations with similar measured 
characteristics is an appropriate way to measure relative wages. The advantage of 
using area-specific control groups is that unmeasured differences in cost of living, 
labor quality, working conditions, and area amenities are controlled for, to the 
extent that area differences in unmeasured wage determinants affect nursing 
personnel and the control groups in a similar manner. We have argued in the paper 
that the control group assumption is reasonable, and that these groups provide an 
appropriate opportunity cost measure of the long-run alternatives available to 
nursing personnel. Although not a perfect control, there is no inherent bias unless 
relative nursejnon-nurse differences in unmeasured labor quality are correlated 
with hospital density and market size (the correlation with size must be strongly 
negative for us to have incorrectly rejected the monopsony hypothesis). 
An additional limitation of the study is that our 50 non-urban state groups do 
not constitute unique labor markets, in part because of large distances between 
non-urban residents within the same state, and in part because of the close 
proximity of some rural resid�nts to urban labor markets. In addition, a very small 
number of metropolitan areas are in close enough proximity to each other such 
that they might be considered a single labor market (this concern is why we chose 
to keep CMSAs whole, rather than break up the largest metropolitan areas into 
their component PMSAs). It also might be argued that there are distinct sub-markets 
within the largest metropolitan areas, although this argument requires the unrealis­
tic assumption that labor mobility is highly limited within large metropolitan areas. 
Given the l imitations of our data for non-urban areas, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that monopsony power is exercised among the relatively small number 
of nursing personnel residing in rural markets. But the absence of statistically 
significant differences in relative wage outcomes between non-urban state groups 
and metropolitan areas and between small and large metropolitan areas, as well as 
the absence of a relationship between relative wages and hospital density, suggest 
that monopsony power is rather limited in scope. Certainly, monopsony should be 
neither routinely nor uncritically provided as an explanation for reported shortages 
in nursing markets. 
Although the analysis casts considerable doubt on the validity of the monop­
sony hypothesis, we have left unexplained why chronic shortages of registered 
nurses have pe'riodically characterized nursing labor markets. The most straightfor­
ward explanation (McKibbin, 1990) is that shortages have been the result of a 
continuing expansion of demand, particularly for highly-skilled nurses, coupled 
with lagged responses in salary increases and in nursing training and labor supply. 
Demand increases have resulted from a growing elderly population, an increased 
ratio of RNs to hospital beds as a complement to more sophisticated medical 
technologies, and an expansion of non-hospital employment opportunities (McKib­
bin, 1990, pp. 15-19). By this scenario, shortages may last for relatively long 
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periods, but should not be permanent. The substantial increase in relative nursing 
wages during the late 1980s and early 1 990s, coupled with the easing of reported 
shortages in the past two years, are consistent with this explanation. We find the 
competitive labor market explanation persuasive, at least compared to the alterna­
tives. It would be more compelling, however, if there were evidence available 
from studies that explicitly model and estimate dynamic labor demand and supply 
models. 
The constancy of relative nursing wages with respect to hospital density and, to 
a lesser extent, market size (relative wages decrease rather than increase with 
respect to size) is largely consistent with the competitive model and inconsistent 
with traditional approaches tc monopsony. One cannot rule out the possibility, 
however, that monopsony power is present throughout the nursing labor market, 
and is at least as strong in large cities with numerous employers as in smaller more 
concentrated markets. That is, one might argue that most employers behave as if 
they were monopsonists, even where there are large numbers of firms and worker 
mobility across employers. The development of models that would predict low 
wage, excess demand equilibria in the presence of many firms is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Such models, however, might help explain sustained nursing 
shortages and similar relative wages across small and large markets. Resort to such 
models has recently occurred as a means of explaining the relatively small 
employment effects of minimum wage laws. 26 Absent substantial theoretical 
progress and compelling evidence in support of a new generation of models with 
monopsonistic outcomes, however, we would not emphasize this explanation for 
nursing shortages. Our analysis casts considerable doubt on the hypothesis that the 
traditional monopsony model is useful in understanding either wage determination 
or shortages in nursing labor markets. 
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